𝗖𝗨𝗥𝗥𝗘𝗡𝗧 𝗙𝗜𝗟𝗘 : /usr/lib/python3.9/site-packages/dnf/__pycache__//dnssec.cpython-39.pyc
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Implements RFC 7929, section 3
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7929#section-3
:param email_address:
:param tag:
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Output of the verification algorithm.
TODO: this type might be simplified in order to less reflect the underlying DNS layer.
TODO: more specifically the variants from 3 to 5 should have more understandable names
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The main class when it comes to verification itself. It wraps Unbound context and a cache with
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In case the key was not found in the cache, create an Unbound context and contact the DNS
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an ASCII armored string in the package description, so it needs to be parsed
before it can be used.
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